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Acid Rain: Detoxifying Diversity Jurisdiction’s
Poisonous Cycle
Baerett R. Nelson1 and Gavyn Roedel

I. Introduction
Unless a federal court is enforcing the Constitution, they lack
authority to create or abrogate state laws. Therefore, in civil court,
if the dispute is over a state law, you will be in state court and vice
versa. A dispute’s governing law will be applied, while the “venue”
is the court that presides over the issue. Oftentimes, a case or dispute
has multiple courts that could exercise “concurrent” jurisdiction;
plaintiffs may select any suitable court, usually filing in whichever
forum is most convenient or advantageous for them. While state
and federal courts always exercise jurisdiction over interpretation of
their respective laws, they may also concurrent jurisdiction through
diversity jurisdiction.
When federal courts serve as venues under diversity jurisdiction,
they lack authority to create state policy or common law; despite
1

“We have all drunk from wells we did not dig, and warmed ourselves
by fires we did not build.” (fmr. US Solicitor Gen. and BYU President,
Rex E. Lee quoting Deut. 6.11). This author would like to offer sincerest
gratitude to those who have most contributed to this paper. In the words
of Abraham Lincoln, “Everything I am, or hope to be, I owe to my angel
mother.” Likewise, this author owes “everything” his mother, to Barbara
Nelson. This author is similarly grateful for countless conversations and
counsel on the topics of this paper provided by his father, the Hon. Ryan
D. Nelson. Finally, Professor E. Farish Percy of the University of Mississippi School of Law was instrumental in instilling passion and understanding through not only her articles, but her personal critique and guidance
of this paper as well. These authors are grateful for her generosity and
indebted to her.
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federal adjudication, state law still governs. Accordingly, legal outcomes of diversity courts must be substantively the same as in state
venues. This creates an “anomalous position” for federal judges who
ordinarily must “abstain from state law question[s]” but must predict
a state tribunal’s ruling if a case is brought under diversity jurisdiction.2 This carve-out of states’ absolute authority to preside over
their laws was first adopted through the Judiciary Act of 1789 and is
now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The Court has determined that federal tribunals must maintain
state substantive law and federal procedural law in diversity cases.
These “procedural” differences between state and federal courts
create inherent discrepancies, harmless and unavoidable sans total
obliteration of diversity jurisdiction. However, “substantive” discrepancies also plague the judiciary. These contribute to deviation in
rulings and the “legal outcome” of a case3. The latter cannot be tolerated. In Erie and Guarantee Trust, the Court directed inferior courts
to eliminate “substantive” discrepancies. But despite this jurisprudence, diversity courts err far too often – failing to produce diversity
outcomes that are authentic to their respective state supreme courts.
This damage to state court legitimacy and autonomy calls into question the continued necessity of diversity jurisdiction. The scope of
this paper contains neither an endorsement nor a rejection of diversity jurisdiction altogether. Rather, this debate is included to contextualize the current illness of diversity jurisdiction and emphasize
how desperately it needs change to remain viable.

2

Dolores K Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction, 78
Virginia Law Review 1671-87 (1992).

3

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)
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Federal courts produce incongruent rulings by misinterpreting
state laws4. This incongruence contributes to gamesmanship over
venue as parties seek or flee state rulings. Subsequent proceedings
bloat federal dockets and overextend courts. Exhausted, diversity
courts are more prone to mistakes – especially as they adjudicate
outside their federal “wheelhouse.” Thus, the current state of diversity jurisdiction harms the judiciary through 1) forum gamesmanship, 2) excessive pleadings, 3) exhausted courts, and 4) altered
legal outcomes.
The four core problems of diversity jurisdiction are cyclical, each
one grows the latter. And this toxic cycle continues to worsen. Comprehensive reform is needed; both Congress and the judiciary must
act in concert. This paper proposes five solutions to ensure comprehensive reform. The first three solutions come from Congress:
1) Congress must prevent the snap removal loophole in the Forum
Defendant Rule. 2) Congress must explicitly provide courts with the
permissive power to remand cases where dismissal of claims drops
the amount in controversy below threshold. 3) The Legislature must
award the judiciary greater latitude in staying, certifying, or repairing proceedings concerning novel or complex issues of state law.
Congressional intervention alone is insufficient to combat inadequacies in diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, federal tribunals must
take advantage of these new statutory powers. After doing so, judicial action is required. 1) courts must recognize and apply the Procedural Misjoinder Doctrine. 2) courts should allow and give deference
to post-removal damage stipulations when used as clarification.
4

See Sloviter, id. Referencing incongruent rulings in cases such as Memphis Dev. Found. V Factors ETC., INC 616 F “holding that Elvis Presley’s
‘right of publicity was not inheritable’) Cert. denied 449 US (1980), Factors etc., INC, 652 (2nd Cir. (Deferring to 6th Cir. Prediction of Tenn. Law
despite that court’s admission that they were speculating. Cert. denied
(1982) and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s rejection of the appellate decision as incorrect in Elvis Presley v Crowell and Tennessee’s legislature
enacting a statute to ensure this interpretation.
Elvis Presley Int’l Memorial Foundation v. Crowell, 733289 (Ct. App. of
Tenn. 1987).
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc., v. City of Memphis, 2182718 (U.S. District
Court For The W.D. Tenn. Western Division 2020).
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Cumulatively, these prescriptions equip courts with tests and tools
to defend themselves, reduce forum shopping, filter the removal process, conserve their resources, and properly predicate legal outcomes.

II. Background
A. History and Contemporary
The Constitution established diversity jurisdiction in Article III
Sec. 2 with the intention of transforming federal courts into impartial conduits for certain types of cases. Legal scholars debate the full
range of rationale behind this provision, but the standard theory is
the intention to protect citizens against out-of-state bias. Section 2
addresses the principle of diversity jurisdiction, but it also enables
federal question jurisdiction, (the other significant component of
subject matter jurisdiction.) This, however, was not codified until
1875, while diversity jurisdiction was created by the very first judicial law Congress passed in 1789. Thus, for nearly a century, diversity jurisdiction was the first, and only extension of federal tribunal
adjudication over state law proceedings.
Cautious of unbridled federal power, early legislatures leashed
the supervision of state cases. Protective stop gates included the
retention of concurrent state authority and requirement of litigant
consent. Importantly, these federal forums were required to maintain
state governing law, rather than federal statutes (the evolution of this
principle is addressed more extensively later in this paper). These
measures help avoid nullification of state court validity. Today, Congress has created additional measures as a response to both policy
concerns and federalism concerns- these have diminished, but have
not eliminated, diversity cases.
Modern policy makers must walk a tightrope between conflicting
responsibilities: respecting states’ rights but also intervening when
“the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial.” One of the
earliest concepts of diversity jurisdiction is found in Federalist No.
80. Here, Madison proposes concurrent jurisdiction between federal
and state courts in litigation where “the State tribunals cannot be

Acid Rain: Detoxifying Diversity Jurisdiction’s Poisonous Cycle

209

supposed to be impartial and unbiased.”5 Though hotly debated6 and
somewhat apathetically defended7, a desire to strengthen national
identity and incubate interstate commerce8, as well as ensuring
access to “unbiased” forums, ensured diversity jurisdiction’s inclusion in the Constitution.9
A broadly accepted rational for diversity jurisdiction is to protect against out-of-state bias. But “…critics also often argue that even
if… local bias exists… legal framework for diversity jurisdiction is
not adequately tailored to address local bias concerns.” Diversity
jurisdiction has been extended to circumstances absent the threat
of out-of-state bias. Nevertheless, these two criteria (buttressed by
5

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 80

6

With the gradual decline in state sovereignty and sectional identity,
arguments that the decay of state bias eliminates the need for diversity
jurisdiction have grown and persist today. The complexity of policing
its use, its drain of judicial resources, contributions to forum shopping,
federalism concerns, and the potential for incongruence in the application of State law, have stoked the fire for proponents of its abolition. At
times, Congress, federal court advisory committees, and even Supreme
Court justices have advocated for the abrogation or complete abolishment
of diversity jurisdiction. See generally, The Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee April 2, 1990 (proposing the near-complete undoing
of diversity jurisdiction.); See also, Reports of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 8-9 (Mar. & Sept.
1977) (endorsing H.R. 761, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which proposed
abolition of diversity jurisdiction)

7

Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harvard
Law Review. 483, 484 (1928) “The most astounding thing, however, is
not the vigor of the attack but the apathy of the defense.”
“As to its cognizance of disputes between citizens of different states, I will
not say it is a matter of much importance. Perhaps it might be left to the
state courts.”
Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the adoption of the federal constitution in the
convention held at Philadelphia in 1787 48-50 (2nd ed. 1907).

8

Scott Dodson, Beyond Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 69 Duke Law Journal 267-322 (2019).

9

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “The [Federal] judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases… between a State and Citizens of another State;”
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caselaw and supplemental statutes,) gatekeep federal forum access.
Requiring complete diversity of citizenship works to filter out cases
where out-of-state bias is not an overt concern.
B. Jurisdiction
Federal courts are “of limited jurisdiction[.]”10 Policy and constitutional concerns demand that criteria exist to limit the courts’ power
and to stem the drain of their resources. 28 U.S.C. §1441 and §1332
detail the two criteria for diversity jurisdiction, demanding that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and that the parties’ state
citizenship is completely diverse.11 The absence of either criteria
destroys jurisdiction and results in the case being remanded to state
court through party motion or sua sponte by the federal court12. If
these conditions are met, the plaintiff, as “Master of the Claim,”
may initiate proceedings in federal court. Otherwise, a defendant
may also “remove” state court proceedings to federal court. These
conflicting rights over litigants’ choice of venue can lead to “venue
gamesmanship,” “litigation tourism,” or “forum shopping.”
Forum shopping occurs when plaintiffs or defendants jockey
for their preferred forum – Often by manipulating their pleadings. 13
Because defendants covet the benefits of federal court, they are incentivized to remove state cases whenever possible. Naturally, plaintiffs
work to frustrate defendant tactics and deprive them of jurisdiction.
10

Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)

11

28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 1332.

12

Vanessa Wilkins; Victoria Pouncy; Annette Stapleton; And Shannon
Stapleton v. Marissa Stapleton; And John Does 1-25, 617 (U.S. District
Court, M.D. Fla., Orlando Division. 1987).
One judge expressed his outrage at litigant failure to properly allege
federal jurisdiction, writing with “the desperate hope that perhaps—just
perhaps—members of the Bar will read… this reminder: ‘[f]ederal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction!’ …This failure to demonstrate even
a passing familiarity with the jurisdictional requirements of the federal
courts results in a waste of judicial resources that cannot continue.”

13

Neil Goldberg, Fraudulent Misjoinder: Combating Artful Pleadings Designed to Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction, For The Defense 12-17 (2015).
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This battle leads to aggressive and even deceitful maneuvering by
both parties; the beachhead being the two criteria.
Defendants often pursue removal due to federal courts’ perceived benefits: chiefly, impartial federal judges, better odds at settling, and Federal (rather than state) Rules of Civil Procedure. These
differences can shift the scales in a lawsuit, and plaintiffs will often
work to thwart a removal if possible. Other perceived benefits stem
from variations not between courts, but in attorney demographics
and their subsequent familiarities with certain legal procedure:
Plaintiff attorneys represent individuals in 75% of the sample
cases. Privately owned corporations comprised an additional 15% of
plaintiff attorneys’ cases, with other types of businesses making up
most of the remainder. Defense attorneys primarily represent businesses, with insurance companies and publicly owned corporations
each equaling 30% of the defense clients. Defense attorneys represent individual citizens in 9.4% of cases and state or local government in 3.2% of cases.14
Plaintiffs representing individuals may suppose sympathy from
state judges and juries, while high-powered corporate defense attorneys frequently deal with the uniform federal courts and assume
more favorable attitudes towards their massive clients. These demographics help rationalize why plaintiffs generally prefer state court
and defendants may flee to federal jurisdiction when possible. The
data reflects these perceptions: “[plaintiff] win rate in original diversity cases is 71%, but in removed diversity cases it is only 34%[.]”15
Choice of forum matters. Unfortunately, the importance of venue
choice compels many defendants to remove litigation even when a
claim fails to meet the jurisdictional criteria. Today, the sheer volume of resources drained by illegitimate diversity proceedings has
become a significant problem. Original diversity jurisdiction produces about 36% of all private cases in federal district court dockets,
14

Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases
Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 14 The American
University Law Review 369-452 (1992).

15

Kevin M Clermont, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the
Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell Faculty
Law Publications 581-607 (1992).
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and even more diversity cases are removed after initial filing in
state court.16

III. Key Problems
The first key problem is that of forum shopping. Forum shopping,
gamesmanship, or “litigation tourism,” is when litigants fight over a
case’s venue. Minor “jockeying” or posturing for preferable courts
are part of the practice of law. It is not a travesty for lawyers to gravitate towards an equal, but preferential forum. However, when we see
a constant tug of war over forums due to different applications of the
same law, this becomes a problem.
To keep forum shopping in check, it is necessary to identify and
minimize factors that stimulate it. Erie permits procedural differences as non-impactful on the legal outcome – these are tolerable and
need not be eliminated. However, substantive differences between
state and federal courts do impact the legal outcome. Distinguishing
between the two is critical in healing diversity jurisdiction. Once
we understand where differences in legal outcomes come from, we
can better target them in our prescriptions. Federal civil procedure
itself lends benefits to defendants more often than plaintiffs. Plaintiff attorneys more commonly represent individuals, while defense
attorneys largely work for larger firms or public and incorporated
companies.17
A. Confusion and Abuse of Courts
Litigants engaging in procedural duels have little regard for presiding judges who may get caught in the crossfire. Legal tactics have
evolved through an arms race of abuse and when the dust has settled,
massive legal fees and exhausted judges remain. Perhaps one of the
most complex, and therefore prone to manipulation, general areas of
law is the removal. Just as a home field advantage impacts rivalry
16

United States, Judicial Business 2020, United States Courts https://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2020.

17

Wilkins v. Stapleton

Acid Rain: Detoxifying Diversity Jurisdiction’s Poisonous Cycle

213

football games, familiar forums can provide parties with a slight
edge in their legal skirmishes. Obviously, a game needs a field, and
a court case needs a courtroom, but as much as fans lament poor or
inconstant calls by refs, judge discrepancies or “bad calls” lead to
much more than lost games or heckling. Attorneys are no dummies:
they recognize and pursue the opportunity for incongruent legal outcomes or federal “Erie Guesses” which may favor their clients. This
spurs forum shopping and fraudulent or excessive moves and procedural complexity.
Circuit and district splits are vulnerable to abuse by litigants
which comes to the expense of judicial resources. By identifying
areas of confusion, plaintiffs can increase their odds of remand,
while defendants can chart a course straight into federal court. These
confusing legal concepts should be clarified to reduce circuit splits.
B. Exhaustion of Judicial Resources
When plaintiffs prefer federal court, they simply file there. Defendants are unlikely to contest federal jurisdiction. Remands in these
cases occur almost exclusively sua sponte. Most altercations over
diversity jurisdiction follow removal by defendants. Evaluating jurisdiction has proved particularly challenging and subsequent circuit
splits have emerged. Confusion and nonconformity over many niche
areas of removal law have therefore confounded courts and depleted
time on the part of both litigants and judges. Unfortunately, federal
courts face daunting caseloads; they do not have time to waste.

214
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Federal dockets are bloated.18 Even aside from the drain of
removal proceedings, the federal judicial system is straining under
the weight of massive caseloads and ill-furnished benches. The
Founders wisely recognized the importance of evaluating lifetime
tenured judges and structured the confirmation process with several
failsafe measures. In the past, these floodgates have merely served as
barriers against unsuitable candidates. But as the American population has grown and society has become more litigious, these barriers
have impeded judicial capabilities. The result is judicial vacancies
and a shrunken quantity of judges who must undertake an overwhelming amount of work.19

18

Sudhin Thanawala, Wheels of justice slow at overloaded federal courts,
AP News (Sept. 27, 2015), https://apnews.com/article/54175de3d735409a
b99a2f10e872d58e.
“California’s Eastern District, which covers a large swath of the state that
includes Sacramento and Fresno, has had an unfilled judicial vacancy for
nearly three years, and it has the same number of judicial positions —
six — it had in 1978, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts… In the late 1990s, the median time for civil cases to go to trial
in the district averaged 2 years and four months. From 2009 to 2014, that
number jumped by more than a year. The median time to resolve criminal
cases nearly doubled to an average of 13 months.” (
Also remarking: “The Judicial Conference of the United States, the
national policy-making body for the federal courts, has recommended
Congress double the number of judicial positions in the district.”

19

Tracey Tully, Judges Juggle Over 2,700 Cases Each as Families Wait for
Day in Court, The New York Times (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/03/17/nyregion/federal-court-nj-judges.html.
The federal district of New Jersey is considered one of the nation’s busiest. One third of its judicial seats are vacant and each seated judge has left
with a pending caseload “well over three times that national average.” also
quoting Professor Carl Tobias, a federal court scholar and professor at the
University of Richmond School of Law stating that New Jersey’s judicial
vacancies are “a bad situation and it’s been bad for a long time,” “And
you compound it with a year of Covid, and it’s a worst-case scenario.”
Craig Carpenito, formerly the State’s top federal prosecutor, criticizes the
overload which forces “judges were working around the clock, and that’s
not sustainable,” “…You’re walking out late at night and their cars are
still there. They’re there on weekends.”
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Increased politicization of judicial appointments is one catalyst
for the growing suffocation of federal judges.20 To some degree the
sheer magnitude of their importance has always created political
pressure for nominations.21 However, the degree of bitterness and
contention stirred by contemporary appointees at all levels of the
federal judiciary has never been so pronounced. Political pressure
now makes appointing federal judges more strenuous22 and makes
the creation of new courts a virtual political impossibility. Congressmen recognize this, and politicians and pundits across the aisle frequently bemoan how their candidates become political footballs. But
when the shoe is on the other foot, they are often all too quick to

20

In the 1980’s it was not unusual for the confirmation of Justices to be
unanimous. Sanda Day O’Connor (99-0) and Anthony Kennedy (97-0)
faced little to no political opposition. See generally, How Politicized Judicial Nominations Polarize Attitudes Toward the Courts (Jon C. Rogowski
and Andrew R. Stone, H.L.R. 2018)

21

The confirmation of John Marshall (who simultaneously served as US
Secretary of State and the country’s 4th Chief Supreme Court Justice,)
was accompanied by significant legal turmoil. Due to his strong commitment to judicial restraint, Federalists and Anti-Federalists sparred over his
nomination and entire courts were abolished in the wake of these disputes;
compare the relative calm that followed with the rise in candidate scrutiny
beginning with President Coolidge’s appointment of Harlan Fiske Stone,
the first Supreme Court appointee dragged before the Senate Judiciary
Committee before his appointment in 1941. Nowadays even appellate
appointees are grilled by members of the senate and votes typically fall
strictly on party lines.

22

Despite this, President Trump was able to appoint a staggering 245 Federal judges due to support from a Republican Senate and the leadership of
Senator Mitch McConnell.
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assail the other party’s appointees.23 Even if all existing vacancies
could be filled, Congress has failed to set up sufficient judgeships. The
number of Circuit courts has also remained the same since 1891.24
To relieve the exhausted judiciary, the Judicial Conference of the
United States has suggested reform.25 But, such legislation, though
sorely needed, is likely too politically hot.26 Debates over both the
number and location of new judgeships would be heated and prolonged. The politics hindering the federal judicial deserve a complete
and independent analysis, the specifics of which are outside the scope
of this paper. Suffice it to say, it is critical that the needless drain
23

Ben Sasse, Sasse on Kavanaugh Hearing: We Can And We Should Do Better Than This, US Senator for Nebraska Ben Sasse (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/sasse-on-kavanaughhearing-we-can-and-we-should-do-better-than-this.
Senator Ben Sasse recognized the absurd levels this politicization had
reached, admitting that Republicans were guilty of it as well. “Judge:
Since your nomination in July, you’ve been accused of hating women,
hating children, hating clean air, wanting dirty water…. declared an existential threat to our nation. Alumni of Yale Law School… wrote a public
letter to the school saying quote, ‘People will die if Brett Kavanaugh
is confirmed.’… We can and we should do better than this. It’s predictable now that every confirmation hearing is going to be an overblown,
politicized circus. (Remarks during the hearing on the nomination of Brett
Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court, 2018)

24

The Judiciary Act of 1891, or the Evarts Act, reorganized the Federal
Circuit Courts. This number of courts has remained unchanged.

25

See, Recent Recommendations by the Judicial Conference for New U.S.
Circuit and District Court Judgeships: Overview and Analysis (Sept.
2019), arguing the necessity of these expansions by stating that Congress
has not approved comprehensive judgeship legislation since 1990, (although they acknowledge that a smaller number of district court judgeships have since been realized.)

26

Testimony before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 117 Cong. (2021) (Statement of Kari Kammel).
Chief District Judge Kimberly Mueller of the Eastern District of California also recognized this longstanding issue and Congress’ failure to
address it: “For 20 years-plus we’ve been in a judicial emergency,” The
bottom line of my testimony today is that we cannot fulfill our obligations
without congressional action to create new judgeships.”
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of courts’ limited time and energy is addressed and prevented. In
undertaking this endeavor, it is impossible to pass over the waste
caused by frivolous filings, proceedings, cases, confusion, and
gamesmanship, which can be solely attributed to removal through
diversity jurisdiction.27
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Federal Courts Study Committee offered guidance to “improve the federal courts capacity to
resolve disputes... by relieving them of some functions that involve
federal rights or interests only marginally if at all.”28 This Study proposed a complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction to stretch courts’
insufficient resources.29 There is strong support for and against this
proposal, as well as alternate solutions.30 The wide acknowledgment
of problems within diversity jurisdiction is clear evidence that if
diversity jurisdiction is to remain, it desperately needs comprehensive reform.
Federalism issues aside, the policy recognition that diversity
jurisdiction is broken is important and must be addressed. After
all, “Justice delayed is justice denied” is not merely an adage, but

27

United States Government, Caseload Statistics Data Tables 4.3 and 4.8,
United States Courts (Dec. 31, 2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/caseload-statistics-data-tables.
In 2019, diversity cases accounted for over 35% of U.S. District Court
civil dockets, removals alone were responsible for about 12% of the
entirety of Federal District court litigation.

28

Id. At 13.

29

There was also legislation proposed to abolish diversity jurisdiction and
provide State courts federal funding to help with the resulting influx of
cases.

30

Federal Courts Access Act of 2018, S. 3249, 115th Cong. (2018).
Intended to increase out-of-state litigants access to federal courts “By
creating a minimal diversity requirement consistent with the vision of the
very first Congress,” but this bill never became law.

218
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a Constitutional right.31 The exhaustion of judicial resources is a
severe problem; diversity cases are responsible for that problem.32 To
prune out needless proceedings, reduce gamesmanship, and clarify complex removal issues is to help resolve this key problem—a
problem so grave it solicits calls for the utter abolishment of diversity
jurisdiction.
C. Perforation and Misprediction of State Caselaw
As counsel flood the federal courts with diversity cases, they simultaneously deprive states of important cases and kneecap their ability to develop caselaw and provide judges with experience. This is
another cyclical problem, as diversity migration strips cases from
states. litigants may advantage of richer and more developed federal
jurisprudence.
Especially in matters of law with sparse state guidance, lower
federal courts will turn to federal appellate predictions of similar
issues. These appellate decisions may be incorrect Erie guesses33
but by the time state courts can correct them countless decisions
may be swayed and guided by subpar appellate predictions of state
law. States must govern themselves and create their own laws; any
31

U.S. Const. amend. § 6.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial…” Though this paper focuses on civil litigation, Federal
dockets also include criminal cases. The policy concern for civil litigants
who receive delayed justice is parallel to the jeopardy Constitutional
rights are placed in due to exhaustion of judicial resources. This Constitutional crisis is thus partially created by defects in diversity jurisdiction.

32

Wilkins v. Stapleton
Judge Dalton wrote: “The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida is one of the busiest district courts in the country and its limited
resources are precious. Time spent screening cases for jurisdictional defects, issuing orders directing repair of deficiencies, then rescreening the
amended filings and responses to show cause orders is time that could and
should be devoted to the substantive work of the Court.”

33

Id. At 2
“Some Federal courts even rely on federal over State precedence at pre“Erie” levels.”
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encroachment on policymaking is a travesty.34 Under diversity jurisdiction, devastating blows to federalism land all too frequently.
Take Memphis Dev. Found. V Factors Etc., INC,35 for example.
Here, the 6th Circuit oversaw how defamation and publicity laws in
Tennessee could extend to Elvis Presley’s son. The 6th Circuit ruling set strong precedence which was followed by a number of cases
including in Factors Etc., INC, v Pro Arts, INC, one year later. 36
Despite the Factors Court’s “admission that they were speculating,”37
they nevertheless stuck to the 6th Circuit’s persuasive prediction of
Tennessee law. These predictions were wrong and later rejected in
Elvis Presley v Cronwell by the State of Tennessee when its courts
were finally presented with a similar matter.38 State courts have no
way to rectify these skewed interpretations of their own laws.39 Many
state courts lacked mechanisms for advisory opinions or certification and were therefore could unable provide any form of mandatory
or even persuasive guidance to federal courts.40

34

Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harvard. Law. Review. 483, 484 (1928)

35

Dolores K Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through
the Lens of Federalism, 78 Virginia Law Review 1671-1687 (1992).

36

Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978)

37

Id. at 24.

38

Elvis Presley v Cronwell, 733 S.W 2d 89, 95-99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)
Where the Tennessee appellate court “[provided] that the right of publicity
is exclusive in individuals and heirs until terminated.

39

Many states today do allow for certification, but Pullman is too narrow
and federal courts occasionally ignore guidance from the very courts
whose ruling they ought to emulate.

40

See, United Services Life Ins. Co. v Delaney, 396 S.W. 2d 855, 862-63
(Tex. 1965)
(Regretfully refraining from certification as the Supreme Court of Texas
lacked the pertinent procedural mechanisms. Consequently, the Court held
that issuance of a Declaratory Judgment for the 5th Circuit constituted an
“Impermissible advisory opinion.”; See also, United Services Life Ins. Co.
v Delaney, 328 F. 2d 483
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Diversity rulings are “coined predictions of state law” that may
be seen as “less abrasive,”41 but they are nonetheless damaging to
states’ rights.42 Perforation of state caselaw poses a federalism risk
that can and should be mitigated. This mitigation should take the
form of increased state guidance. While the Supreme Court has provided narrow circumstances for state intervention in diversity cases,
it does not go far enough. Federal courts ought to be chomping at the
bit to receive state tribunals’ “two cents,” on their own laws, but they
currently fall short of even Supreme Court standards on certification
and abstinence.
Without comprehensive change, these defects will get worse, not
better. Symptoms of the “toxic cycle” will continue to jeopardize
justice. America must have legitimacy in its courts. Fraud, exhaustion, and incongruence born of attunement and exhaustion make that
impossible. Only by reversing the cycle can we preserve diversity
jurisdiction as a viable mechanism to allow federal jurisdiction.

IV. Solutions
The breadth and depth of these problems warrant comprehensive
reform that is just as broad and deep. The Toxic Cycle of forum shopping, excessive removals, exhaustion of judicial resources, misprediction and incongruence, and incentive for more forum shopping
continues and worsens at the expense of justice. Federal tribunals
and litigants are in desperate need of change. In the words of AC/
DC, “There ought to be a law… there ought to be a whole lot more.”43
We prescribe 5 solutions, both legislative and judicial, to cure these
current defects. Our solutions are both legislative and judicial guidance and encompass the removal process and diversity jurisdiction
all along the way.
Our Statutory claims consist of providing federal courts permissive powers to remand if a case’s amount in controversy drops below
41
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Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).
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the threshold, and to allow greater latitude to federal courts predicting novel or complex issues of state law, and to close the “Snap
Removal” loophole. Next, our judicial prescriptions offer guidance
to tribunals regarding Fraudulent misjoinders, Post Removal Damage Stipulations and reach out to states to ensure state law is interpreted correctly.
Applied altogether, these prescriptions will dramatically slim
bloated dockets, allow courts to interpret state law more accurately,
reduce artificial differences between the forums, and reduce the need
for attorneys to forum shop. Like the toxic cycle that currently exists,
this healthy cycle will clean out and recurring change will slowly but
persistently promote positive change to diversity jurisdiction.
Litigants need these changes, judges need these changes, and justice demands these changes. We will prove that the benefit of implementing these changes is needed and for the greater good. These
changes adhere to principles of federalism and are easily and uncontrovertibly attainable. Lastly, we will prove that our approaches are
the optimal way to make these needed changes.
A. Legislative Prescriptions
The first three solutions require Congress to provide relief. The
Forum Defendant Rule, as it stands, does not promote justice. The
text of this law reads “otherwise removable solely on the basis of
diversity of jurisdiction . . . may not be removed if any of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.”44 Currently, defendants
who should be blocked from federal forums are able to circumvent
that restriction by fleeing before they are properly served. Especially
with the growth of technology in law, attorneys are hyper aware of
impending lawsuits and able to see court filings long before being
properly served in person. Additionally, defense attorneys may
advise or encourage their clients to avoid or dodge service until they
are able to remove. We propose that Congress rewrite this law so that
the “and served” language is stricken. An acceptable solution could
44

Removal of Civil Actions, 28 U.S.C. § 14412 (LexisNexis).
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be: “…may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly
joined as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought…”
As it is written, there are split circuits regarding snap removals.45 Experienced judges who take this route are not wrong, they
are just using different statutory interpretations. Those courts which
have found snap removals permissible do so under valid and sound
reasoning. A textualism reading finds no fault with exploiting this
loophole. After all, Defendants must have been served per the exact
text of the law. Judges should not be forced to rejection the text and
rely on purposivism or legislative intent in their analysis. As Justice
Kagan famously said, “we are all textualists now.”
Judges using a purposivism interpretation or legislative intent
consider why this law was written, instead of the explicit text.
This equally valid theory of interpretation looks to the purpose
of the law: to prevent defendants from fleeing their home states.
Many judges now recognize and reject snap removals. The ravine
between purpose and text is a defect that should be cured by Congress. Fixing broken laws is not the prerogative of the federal judiciary. These powers belong to Congress, they do not belong to the
judiciary. It is federal overreach for judges to apply this law flex45

Compare, Encompass Insurance Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc.,
902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018). There, the court reviewed whether § 1441(b)
(2) permits snap removal by a forum defendant concluding the “language
of the forum defendant rule in section 1441(b)(2) is unambiguous. Its
plain meaning precludes removal on the basis of in state citizenship only
when the defendant has been properly joined and served.” The court
acknowledged that “[r]easonable minds might” question the policy of that
result, but did not consider that question relevant to its statutory interpretation. With Second Circuit precedent that “[t]he statute plainly provides
that an action may not be removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship once a home state defendant has been ‘properly joined
and served.’” Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)).
“By its text, then, Section 1441(b)(2) is inapplicable until a home state
defendant has been served in accordance with state law[.]” Id. The Court
added that “while it might seem anomalous to permit a defendant sued
in its home state to remove a diversity action,” that practice “’does not
contravene’ Congress’s intent to combat fraudulent joinder.”

Acid Rain: Detoxifying Diversity Jurisdiction’s Poisonous Cycle

223

ibly purely because they want it to be that way. § 1441(b)(2) should
therefore be rewritten.46
State court systems have evolved through American history. It
was only in the mid to late 1900’s that states even uniformly established intermediate courts, and state supreme court certiorari was
established even later.47 States have historically lacked procedures to
provide effective guidance for diversity cases. Now, however, most
states have adopted processes to advise in these instances. But federal procedure and caselaw limit state input. To ensure accurate prediction, circumstances should be expanded and methods for seeking
state participation guidance should be enlarged.
The next legislative prescription is to grant courts wider latitude to receive state input regarding novel or complex issues of state
law. Our solutions will conserve federal judicial resources and provide more time and energy to properly predict state rulings. However, increased resources are insufficient to rout misinterpretation.
Although many federal district court judges will be from the state
they preside over, they are still imperfectly suited to predict state
law. Deviation in outcome is largely due to a lack of attunement of
federal judges to state policy.
Especially at the appellate level, federal judges preside over broad
regions of states. The 9th Circuit, for example, includes dramatically
different state cultures from states such as California, Hawaii, or
Alaska. Out-of-state judges are not attuned to state politics, history,
or culture. They are also less experienced in interpreting state law.
They therefore pose a federalism risk that can and should be mitigated. This mitigation should take the form of state guidance.
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See generally, It’s Time for Congress to Snap to It and Amend 28 § U.S.C.
1441(1)(b)(2) to Prohibit Snap Removals That Circumvent the Forum
Defendant Rule, 73 Rutgers University Law Review 579 (2021).
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M O Osthus; M H Stiegler, State Intermediate Appellate Courts,
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Current Abstention Doctrines include, among others, three
separate cases: Pullman, Burford, and Colorado River.48 Pullman
abstention permits diversity courts to “restrain” their adjudication
when states can resolve litigation. This done to alleviate federalism
concerns and practice “scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments[.]”49 Burford abstention outlines two
instances where federal courts can abstain from diversity proceedings: 1) “difficult [and substantive] questions of state law” or 2) judgment would be “disruptive [to] state efforts to establish a coherent
policy.”50 Lastly, Colorado River abstention can stop proceedings
when parallel case(s) are proceeding in state court.51 The Colorado
River Court directed inferior courts to only abstain in ”exceptional
circumstances”.52 This doctrine, along with Pullman and Burford,
are far too narrow.
While these three cases serve to limit needless proceedings and
protect state judicial sovereignty, they do not go far enough. We
propose Congress codify the express power for diversity courts to
abstain from adjudication temporarily at the request of states, or liberally when any of these doctrines are met.
When there is uncertainty as to how a state supreme court would
rule, they should liberally abstain from judgment. In these cases, federal courts should abstain from ruling until a similar case is decided
on the state level, until they can obtain certification from the state,
or until state courts can repair matters of law in the case. While state
certification and advisory opinions are not technically mandatory,
there is little to no reason that federal courts should not follow them.
The right to create state law belongs solely to the state.
Federal courts benefit greatly from certification of novel and
complex issues of state law. Certification amplifies the ability of
48

See generally, Martha A. Field Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 590 (1977).
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federal courts to predict accurate legal outcomes. Congress should
therefore codify greater authority for certification or the advisement of diversity rulings. Likewise, if certain legal issues can be
severed, they should be repaired or remanded for state resolution.
Again, federal courts already possess these powers, they simply
need them expanded.
Lastly, Congress award courts permissive remand the amount in
controversy drops below the threshold. Several courts have already
set this precedent. They consider the policy implications as well
as potential federalism issues. Indeed, if a case does not meet the
threshold federal courts arguably lack jurisdiction and must therefore immediately remand. St. Paul Mercury leads to disagreement
over this approach and appellate courts are consequently split. In
fairness, since criteria is determined “at the moment of removal,”53 it
is unclear how courts should respond.
More settled is the application of St. Paul Mercury to the diversity of citizenship criteria. It is well-established that if parties move
during litigation, it does not destroy diversity. However, if it is later
discovered that complete diversity of citizen did not exist at removal,
courts are prohibited from retaining proceeding and must remand.
Even final decisions have been post-humorously vacated if it is discovered that diversity jurisdiction conditions were not met.54
The argument, therefore, is whether a non-meritorious claim
was non-meritorious from the start. If so, and a subsequent dismissal
merely represents a recognition of what already existed, it follows
that courts should remand if the amount in controversy was insufficient initially. A policy consideration is that courts’ resources should
53

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ford, 585 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1978).

54

Thermoset Corp. v. Building Materials Corp of Am., 849 F.3d 1313, 1315
(11th Cir. 2017).
(Vacating summary judgment for the plaintiff where trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the presence of a non-diverse defendant);
Peninsula Asset Mgmt. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Hankook Tire Co., 509 F.3d 271,
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be conserved for cases which warrant their attention. And who better than the presiding judge to make that determination. Admittedly,
these remands would increase state caseload, but only nominally.55
This approach provides needed relief to the judicial system,
while allowing defendants access to a neutral forum when the controversy is truly over $75,000. This prescription ensures that cases
which belong in federal court, stay in federal court; it also leaves
judges to discern which cases do not belong and would be preserved
at the expense of other lawsuits.
These legislative solutions will provide an influx of judicial
vitality and legitimacy. But making diversity jurisdiction justifiable is a daunting task – legislative change alone is insufficient. Not
only must courts apply these legislative gifts, but they also have
legwork of their own. Empowering legislation is applied ineffectively by overburdened courts; the stem of excessive and fraudulent
drains of federal resources must be eliminated. This means stopping
fraudulent proceedings from both parties. Our judicial prescriptions
accomplish this, outlining actions, tests, and doctrine, that will aid
courts. Court action is the way to do this.
Success of the legislative prescriptions depends on turning the
gears and giving courts breathing room to digest and fully take
advantage of new laws. Until that happens, forum shopping will
continue to plague diversity cases. The front lines of forum shopping are removals, which make up a substantial portion of diversity
cases. Both parties are guilty of greedy manipulation to the detriment of justice. First, defendants employ Snap Removals and other
tricks to secure their judge and forum. Judges should recognize Snap
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Data analysis from the 1970s and 1990s calculated an increase of only
around 1 percent to state dockets from abolition of diversity jurisdiction.
See Victor E Flango & Nora F Blair, The Relative Impact of Diversity
Cases on State Trial Courts 252-253 (1978).
(“If diversity cases were distributed evenly among the states, each state
would experience an average 1.03 percent increase in civil filings . . . .”);
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diversity jurisdiction would increase state caseloads by around 1 percent
and workloads by about 5 percent)
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Removals and use their newfound authority to dismiss and sanction
attorneys who ignore the law.
Contributing to the arms race of jurisdictional manipulation,
“Masters of the Claim” also work to deny their opponents the upper
hand. Plaintiff schemes needlessly burn judicial resources and
attempt to rip away defendants’ legitimate rights. Plaintiffs focus
typically revolves around the criteria required for removal. They
primarily use two methods to destroy federal jurisdiction, attacking it both preemptively and reactively. Our paper focuses on two
prevalent breaches: fraudulent misjoinders and Post Removal Damage Stipulations. Chronologically, plaintiffs first attempted to cheat
the system comes before state proceedings are even initiated; enter
the fraudulent misjoinder.
B. Judicial Prescriptions
Courts have long recognized plaintiff use of the fraudulent joinder
as a scam to anchor their case to state court. This doctrine is when
plaintiff joins invalid or fraudulent claims or parties to an otherwise removable case. These “spoilers” convolute federal proceedings upon removal. Federal courts must sort out whether the claims
are valid and must formulate a response. The accepted way to handle
this is to determine if invalid joinders exist and move to sever or
dismiss them. Evaluating claims upon removal is difficult, and the
element of “fraud” in fraudulent joinders need not stem from an act
of fraud or misrepresentation.
Indeed, courts often must take the time to carve out earnest
or legitimate joinders, effectively performing an analysis akin to
how they would in response to a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This
burns court resources, but the practice has been well documented,
and courts have caught on to this deceit. Although it takes time, the
Fraudulent Joinder Doctrine has evolved and now streamlines court
reactions.56
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What is less clear, however, is how to respond to a fraudulent
misjoinder. Here, plaintiffs join legitimate claims or parties. A fraudulent misjoinder is also referred to as a “Procedural” misjoinder, as
the problem is not substantive but procedural. Fraudulent Misjoinders occur when an unrelated claim or party is linked to another in
a way that destroys diversity. This destruction can arise when complete diversity between the parties is spoiled, or when the unrelated
party is tethered to state court under the Forum Defendant Rule.
This Doctrine may not be understood by defendants or may not be
recognized or applied by courts. In either case the result is the same,
defendants are denied their rights. Even if a court recognizes and
applies the Doctrine, plaintiffs force them and defendants to incur
needless costs.
Circuit courts are split on the Doctrine of Fraudulent Misjoinder. Those which do not recognize it have different rationales. Some
insist that state courts have the responsibility to sever these claims,
but states may lack time and experience needed to respond to every
instance of fraudulent misjoinder. Defendants often rely on Federal
courts as their first opportunity to be disconnected from spoilers.
Other courts simply see remand under diversity jurisdiction as too
complex already; they reject the Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine
as “adding layers of complexity” to an already convoluted process.
These responses are understandable, but a defendants’ right to legitimate diversity jurisdiction must be protected, regardless of Federal
confusion or unfounded concerns of federalism dangers.
Uniform adoption of the Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine would
smooth out needless proceedings and eliminate costly confusion.
We prescribe the uniform approach needed, as well as distinguish
the authority by which courts can identify, sever, and sanction in
instances of fraudulent misjoinders. There is a dire need to prevent
needless proceeding and deprivations of rights caused by rampant
fraudulent joinder.
Tapscott laid the groundwork as courts faced valid spoilers which
were improperly joined to destroy diversity of an unrelated claim or
party. Since then, courts have applied a “Reasonable Basis” test to
determine whether legitimate claims should be joinder. The Tapscott
Court wrote that “other tests are problematic and raise federalism
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concerns because they inappropriately encourage federal courts to
resolve ambiguous or novel questions of state law…”
Using the Reasonable Basis Test to apply the Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine protects rights while reducing judicial drain.
While fraudulent misjoinders destroy diversity of citizenship
criteria. Post removal damage stipulations impact the amount in
controversy requirement. When plaintiffs contest that the amount
in controversy bars removal, some courts have applied a “preponderance of the evidence” test, while others have applied a “facially
apparent” test. Still other circuits have set precedence applying the
far more stringent “Legal Certainty” test, which places the burden
of proof squarely on the plaintiff to prove to a legal certainty that
the amount does not allow federal oversight.57Parties may reach the
requisite amount through various methods. First, aggregation of
damages is allowed when a plaintiff has multiple claims against a
defendant or multiple plaintiffs share similar claims against a defendant that arise from the same circumstances. It is worth noting
that CAFA also raises the $75,000 threshold to $5 million in class
actions.58 In any case, when courts are not confident that the amount
in controversy or complete diversity criteria have been satisfied, they
will turn the case over to the proper state venue.59
Many plaintiffs assert that they are master of the claim and as
such know best how much relief they are requesting. Still others connected through affidavit that they will reject relief over $75,000 even
if it is awarded. Courts are split on how to receive and regard these
post removal damage stipulations. Some circuits have held that St.
Paul Mercury, prevents consideration of these stipulations if filed
57
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after removal. Indeed, allowing affidavits to alter the amount in controversy post removal opens the door for plaintiffs to flee federal
court any time litigation does not go their way.60 Some circuits stand
by outright rejection of post removal damage stipulations, but other
courts take a more liberal view.
Some circuits are willing to accept stipulations indiscriminately.
Even if plaintiffs fail the Legal Certainty Test, these courts may
permit carefully phrased affidavits as the final word on the amount
in controversy. In support of their decisions, courts reason that the
plaintiff is the master of the claim and should have control over what
relief they are seeking. What’s more, allow plaintiffs to amend their
relief requested with the intent to avoid federal court. Districts and
circuit courts have allowed plaintiffs to “sacrifice” relief for the strategic purpose of keeping their preferred forum. Still other courts fall
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, only recognizing post
removal damage stipulations in certain circumstances.
Many circuits have held that while post removal damage stipulations cannot be considered as new evidence to amend their complaint, they may serve to clarify the amount requested. This approach
strikes a balance that these authors endorse. Allowing stipulations
to serve as clarification adheres to Supreme Court precedent and
respects plaintiffs’ right to exercise control over their case. Additionally, this approach offers uniform fairness to plaintiffs in all states,
as litigant complaints’ may be subject to Ad Damnum clauses certain
restrictions depending on the state. These restrictions vary widely.
Ad Damnum clauses are sections of the complaint which list to
relief sought- either attached to the cover page or just in the text of
60
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the complaint. States have total control over how litigants must structure these clauses. Some states require a complaint to specify a range
of damages. Other states may require an exact amount, still others
disallow plaintiffs to list any specific dollar amount as numbers may
act as an anchoring bias to juries or may ignite public attention if a
case unrealistically sues for extravagant amounts.61
Restrictions are all based in different rationale determined at the
sole discretion of state legislature. Federal courts are powerless to
change state policy; they must, however, recognize and react to these
differing standards. The variance in these restrictions necessitates
allowing plaintiffs to stipulate as clarification. Since for many plaintiffs a stipulation might be the first possible opportunity for them to
specify a dollar amount.
Our prescription regarding post removal damage stipulations is
that courts should recognize carefully crafted post removal damage stipulations if done as clarification of their originally requested
amount. These stipulations should then shift the burden of proof to
defendants under the “Reverse-Legal Certainty Test.” Stipulations
must be filed alongside a motion to remand, this precludes wait and
see tactics.
If plaintiffs can “clarify” amount in controversy at any point during federal proceedings, they could wait to see how their case fares
and destroy diversity if the outcome begins to look unfavorable. This
destructive behavior must be prevented. Requiring stipulations to
accompany motions to remand or else be waived eliminates confusion and belated remands. Plaintiffs can remain Master of the Claim,
but courts are not subject to wasted proceedings at the whim of a
plaintiff stipulation.
61
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These 5 legislative and judicial claims address and resolve many
diversity defects. Conserving judicial resources and empowering
courts to accurately predict state law, will promote adherence to the
Erie Doctrine. Issues of federalism, policy concerns, and the general
interest of justice will be promoted if these prescriptions are applied.

V. Conclusion
When federal courts adjudicate under diversity jurisdiction, they
merely act as venue; the governing law is unchanged. The objective is to ensure consistent application of law between all citizens,
but diversity jurisdiction is broken. Ironically, this mechanism now
promotes inconsistency in rulings and reduces justice in intra state
litigation.
Diversity jurisdiction relies on variance between federal and
state courts; they are not supposed to be exactly the same. But the
legal outcome must be. Some variations between the tribunal detract
from justice. Over the years, artificial differences have warped
diversity litigation. Despite clear guidance otherwise, courts are ill
equipped to predict state decisions
The problems in diversity jurisdiction are cyclical in nature: 1)
legal incongruence between state and federal outcomes incentivizes excessive and illegitimate proceedings; 2) the resulting flood
of proceedings overwhelms federal courts, exhausting them and
forcing decisions under the gun; 3) crunched for time, unattuned
federal courts fall short of accurately and swiftly predicting how a
state court would rule, thus creating more incongruence in legal outcomes. This toxic cycle is perpetuated at the expense of justice.
American courts must have legitimacy. Exhaustion and incongruence diminish that. Only by reversing the cycle can diversity
jurisdiction work as a viable mechanism. Courts must act to save
diversity jurisdiction, but as they lack some tools to do so, Congress
must also empower them with a legislative overhaul. First, federal
courts need greater legislative authorization to receive state input
on novel or complex issues. Streamlined processes for certification, repair, and advisement should be accompanied by expansion of
Abstention Doctrines.
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Second, courts require legislation permitting permissive remand
when the amount in controversy below the requisite threshold. Courts
should weigh federal intervention against policy and federalism
concerns. Bestowing these powers provides permission for judges
to redistribute, at their discretion, sorely needed judicial resources
away from cases which no longer justify federal focus.
The third and final legislative prescription is for Congress to
prevent snap removals. The chasm between the text and its intent
indicates a deficit in the law itself, but judges should not fix broken
laws. Congress must ensure judges can uniformly respond to this
loophole.
Courts need codified foundations when they fill gaps in diversity
jurisdiction. Courts must act, but a separation of powers demands the
introduction of these written laws to avoid judicial overreach. With
these three legislative arrows are in their quiver, federal tribunals
must also apply two judicial salves to fully heal diversity jurisdiction. These prescriptions eliminate circuit splits and set the standard
for remanding diversity cases.
Uncertainty and circuit splits exist over the fraudulent misjoinder and post removal damage stipulations. The responses to these
are best left to the judiciary, although like the first three legislative
prescriptions, they could benefit from collective federal action.
First judges should uniformly adopt the Fraudulent Misjoinder
Doctrine and sever spoilers which would improperly destroy diversity. Once these spoilers have been dismissed or remanded, federal
courts are free to adjudicate. Second, judges must allow plaintiffs to
clarify their requested relief thorough damage stipulations. When
these stipulations accompany a motion to remand, they should be
given wide deference and the Reverse-Legal Certainty Test should
be applied. To survive remand, defendants then face the burden pf
proving to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy meets the
requisite threshold.
Diversity jurisdiction will become more viable if these prescriptions are applied and enforced. Fatigued federal tribunals will be
rejuvenated after using these prescriptions to streamline and standardize procedures. Litigants’ rights will be protected, and federalism concerns will be diminished. Since the sickness of diversity
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jurisdiction extends to all stages of litigation, its solutions must also
address aspects from removal to dispositive motions. We therefore
propose these five claims as a wholistic salve. We are confident that
they will be greater together than the sum of their parts.
The Founders envisioned diversity jurisdiction to ensure equal
access to justice. But it currently perpetuates injustice by spewing
unequal results. We cannot stand idly by as our court systems fails to
protect the right to honest resolutions. Everyone deserves a fair and
balanced rule of law. Justice cannot depend on the venue. Ending
the toxic cycle seems daunting, but through implementation of these
prescriptions, it can be done.

